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As every day goes by, it becomes abundantly apparent that the 
prospects of the UK leaving the EU on 31st October with ‘no-deal’ are 
increasing. This is particularly so after the last of the Tory party 
leadership hustings that occurred on Monday evening for The 
Sun/talkRADIO made it clear that both of the contenders believe that 
one of the fundamental parts of the withdrawal agreement (WA that 
was negotiated between Theresa May and her representatives) with 
the so called ‘backstop’, is dead. 
Right from David Cameron’s announcement that there would be a 
referendum held to decide on continued membership of the EU, to 
fulfil a pledge made in the 2015 Conservative manifesto as a sop to 
the Eurosceptic element of his party, a number of commentators, 
myself included, recognised the inherent dangers that such a poll 
could pose for the continued operation of the Good Friday Agreement. 
It’s significant that the potential consequences that the decision of 
voters to leave is due to what historians will regard as ‘cock up’ as 
opposed to conspiracy. 
Cameron believed that following the election in 2015, there would be 
another coalition government with the Liberal Democrat party and that 
their price would be to jettison the promise of a referendum. Not for 
the first time, the judgement of politicians who are expected to know 
better was found to be suspect. Having held the poll, Cameron who 
campaigned for remain, felt that there was no more he could do and 
promptly resigned to be replaced by Theresa May who proudly 
proclaimed her intention to do something to make the lot of those ‘just 
about managing’ (JAMs) better. 
As we are discovering, promises made in the run-up to national polls 
can be somewhat malleable. Nonetheless, had the Liberal Democrats 
not been so unpopular due to their more than tacit support for the 
austerity policies implemented to deal with national debt arising from 
the Global Financial Crisis (caused by bailing the banks out), as well 
as supporting the trebling of university fees to £9,000 per year – 
despite promising to abandon them in their 2015 election manifesto – 
we might not be in the current crisis. 
And crisis is what this country is in. 
David Cameron, as many now believe, foolishly and naively believed 
he could, as the good public relations professional he’d been after 
leaving Oxford and before entering politics, spin the debate to 
produce a majority in favour to remain – effectively silencing 
Eurosceptics within his party and, he hoped, neutralising the threat 
from the UK Independence Party then led by Nigel Farage. What 
Cameron misunderstood was that austerity had made not just the 
poor and disadvantaged feel worse off, but those in work but who felt 
squeezed by higher bills that needed to be paid from stagnating 
wages. 
The background to the 2015 referendum provided a ‘perfect storm’, 
allowing the likes of UKIP and elements within the Conservative Party 
– the curiously named and overtly partisan European Research Group 
(ERG). They shamelessly milked the sense of hopelessness felt by 
many and, with typical aplomb as the politicians they are, offered all 
sorts of blandishments as to the benefits of casting a vote to 
leave.  The fact that UKIP leader Farage and leaders of Vote Leave, 
Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, were acknowledging the 
importance of maintenance of effective trade indicated that the 
consequences of leaving the EU were not seen as being especially 
negative or difficult, quite the contrary. 
Over three years on from the June 2016 referendum, and despite the 
vast amount of evidence presented by the sort of ‘experts’ so derided 
by Michael Gove as being too pessimistic and part of ‘Project Fear’, 
we are in a situation in which no-deal is now widely seen as the only 
effective way to fulfil the wishes of the people who voted to leave. The 
narrative has shifted to the extent that even those who campaigned to 
leave but now argue that leaving with no-deal would be catastrophic 
are regarded as being insufficiently patriotic. 
Worse, those arguing that leaving the EU is a huge mistake from 
which there will be no benefit and significant diminution of economic 
and political standing and that we should revoke Article 50 are 
perceived by Brexiteers and their cheerleaders in the likes of The 
Telegraph and Daily Mail as being akin to traitors. Brexit has opened 
up divisions that, as history demonstrates, can produce the sort of 
instability in less stable countries than the UK that results in civil war. 
Whilst England has been free of civil war since the seventeenth 
century when Parliamentarians led by Oliver Cromwell, the 
“Roundheads” engaged with Royalists led by Charles I and Charles II, 
“Cavaliers”, primarily over the nature of what constituted legitimacy in 
governing England, that cannot be said of the UK as a whole. The UK 
consists of England, Scotland Wales and, of course, Northern Ireland 
which during the period 1969 to 1997 experienced what was known 
as ‘the troubles’ which was the euphemism used for what looked to 
outsiders to be a de facto civil war. 
The origins of conflict in the six counties of Ulster that make up the 
state of Northern Ireland that was created in 1922, Cavan, Donegal 
and Monaghan were excluded as the number of Catholics would not 
have produced the dominance by Protestants than unionists wanted 
in order to achieve an in-built majority, are well known. After almost 
three decades during which, in totality over 3,530 people lost their 
lives and well over 47,500 were injured, the conflict was resolved by 
painstaking negotiation between the major political parties including 
representatives of paramilitary groups from Irish republicans and 
Loyalist groups. 
Had it not been for his ill-judged involvement in the American-led 
invasion of Iraq, the signing of the Good Friday Agreement by then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair would likely have been seen as his greatest 
legacy. Though Blair has regularly warned of the dangers that lie in 
the UK leaving the EU, particularly if it undermines the principles that 
are critical to the agreement, his message is somewhat undermined 
by what his both critic and even admirers perceive to be his toxicity. 
Blair gets much credit for managing to achieve what many had, only a 
few years prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement as 
inconceivable – ardent Irish republicans accepting the state of 
Northern Ireland and agreeing that the future should be decided by 
elected politicians. However, his immediate predecessor as Prime 
Minister, John Major, persevered with the quest for peace despite the 
regularity of atrocities and experienced a mortar attack on No 10 
Downing Street whist chairing a cabinet meeting in 1991. 
For those who’ve never read the Good Friday Agreement it is 
remarkably short at 35 pages. Though regarded by some as having 
been far less specific than it night ideally have been, explicitly 
‘constructively ambiguous’, it deals with the arrangements for a multi-
party agreement by most of Northern Ireland’s political parties (the 
Multi-Party Agreement). Significantly, the main political grouping not 
to sign the Good Friday Agreement was the Democratic Unionist 
Party who have been engaged in providing support for the 
Conservative Party since the 2017 general election. 
The Good Friday Agreement also dealt with arrangements between 
the British and Irish governments (the British–Irish Agreement). 
Additionally, the Good Friday Agreement dealt with the status and 
system of government of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom 
(Strand 1), the relationship between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland (Strand 2) and the relationship between the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (Strand 3). 
At the time of signing the notion that one of these countries would be 
considering leaving the EU would have seemed inconceivable. 
However, in any conflict there are not just the political arrangements 
to be considered but the messy and controversial aspects that result 
from internecine conflict between two communities some of whom, 
even 21 years on, remain implacably opposed to each other requiring 
‘peace walls’ in Belfast. 
Accordingly, matters such as civil and cultural rights were considered 
including policing (the Royal Ulster Constabulary becoming the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland). However, the areas that were most 
difficult to resolve was demilitarisation by the British army that was 
utterly resented by nationalist communities, voluntary 
decommissioning of weapons so that there was no perception of 
surrender and, most controversial of all, the release of prisoners, 
some of whom were involved in what are still regarded as the most 
heinous of crimes. 
These last areas, though benefiting loyalists as much as Irish 
republicans, have been components of the Good Friday Agreement 
that mean that many within the unionist community loathe it. It’s worth 
noting that leave campaigner MP Michael Gove, who was recently 
eliminated as a contender for leadership of what is, to give it its full 
name, the Conservative and Unionist Party, wrote in 2000 in a 
pamphlet The Price of Peace published by right-wing think tank the 
Centre for Policy Studies that it represented a “Trojan horse”. 
Gove also stated that the agreement represented a “denial of our 
national integrity” and “enshrines a vision of human rights which 
privileges contending minorities at the expense of the democratic 
majority” and was a “rigged referendum”, a “mortal stain” and “a 
humiliation of our army, police and parliament”. In comments that, 
were the history not so dreadful and immediate prospects so 
delicately fragile would be laughable, Gove compared the agreement 
to the appeasement of the Nazis in the 1930s and the condoning of 
the desires of paedophiles. 
Sadly, it seems, in the desire to play to whatever gallery he thinks will 
give him greatest gratification, putative PM Boris Johnson appears 
unable and/or unwilling to accept that the principles of the Good 
Friday Agreement are enshrined in law and protected by international 
agreement. To claim that his alternative approach to negotiation will 
force the other 27 EU members to capitulate is palpably nonsensical. 
The EU’s continued ability to operate is vested in consensus. To do 
otherwise would be to effectively undermine everything the 
organisation has struggled so long and so hard to achieve as an 
economic and political entity. Besides, if the EU were to cave in and 
suddenly agree to terms even more generous that May was able to 
achieve, and which constitutional expert Professor Vernon Bogdanor 
stated at the Centre for Brexit’s annual conference in London on 
29th March, to be far better than the UK should have hoped to attain, it 
would possibly create a ‘domino effect’ of other EU members wishing 
to follow the example of the UK in leaving but maintaining significant 
benefits. 
Even assuming that Johnson could achieve some alteration in the 
Withdrawal Agreement, which must include arrangements for 
maintenance of the Good Friday Agreement. If only one member does 
not agree, such as, in particular, the Republic of Ireland, there can be 
no change. 
Writing on the InFacts Website on Tuesday afternoon, Nick Kent in an 
article titled ‘Johnson and Hunt say backstop is dead. But for how 
long?’ examines why the backstop was originally proposed, in order to 
ensure there is no return to a ‘hard border’ in Ireland but has 
“bedevilled the Brexit process” Kent neatly sums up the current stance 
of Johnson and Hunt as a “shabby exercise in macho posturing” 
based on making “increasingly more extreme promises in order to 
attract the votes of their Brexit Party supporting membership” 
As Kent concludes: 
“However much the backstop is disliked, it has not been replaced 
because of the lack of a credible alternative.  Hunt and Johnson can 
declare it dead but that doesn’t solve the problem it was created to 
address. And crashing out without a deal would, by empowering the 
men of violence, risk replacing one problem on the border with 
another.  The winning Tory leadership candidate may find himself 
trying to resurrect the backstop before the year is out.” 
For everyone’s sake let’s hope that some sanity the sort of considered 
and careful thinking displayed by the likes of John Major is exhibited 
by whoever becomes the next PM. The last thing we want is the 
return of Oliver’s Army, the title of the 1979 single brilliant songwriter 
Elvis Costello who, having witnessed the troubles first-hand in Belfast 
wanted to send a message that conflict may create jobs for the 
security forces but brings misery to the local population. 
 
